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Quantum Key Distribution with the BB84 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure
even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered
by these methods are limited due to the loss in the quantum channel (e.g. loss in the optical fiber)
and in the single-photon counters of the receivers. One can argue that the loss in the detectors
cannot be changed by an eavesdropper in order to increase the covered distance. Here we show
that the security analysis of this scenario is not as easy as is commonly assumed, since already
two-photon processes allow eavesdropping strategies that outperform the known photon-number
splitting attack. For this reason there is, so far, no satisfactory security analysis available in the
framework of individual attacks.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is a technique
that allows two parties (Alice and Bob) to generate a
secret key despite the computational and technological
power of an eavesdropper (Eve) who interferes with the
signals. Together with the Vernam cipher [3], QKD can
be used for unconditionally secure data transmission.
The basic ingredient of anyQKD protocol is the distri-
bution of effective quantum states that can be proved to
be entangled [4]. The first complete scheme for QKD is
that introduced by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84
for short) [2]. In a quantum optical implementation of
this protocol, Alice encodes each random bit into the po-
larization state of a single-photon. She chooses for her
encoding one of two mutually unbiased bases, e.g. either
a linear or a circular polarization basis. On the receiving
side, Bob measures each photon by selecting at random
between two polarization analyzers, one for each possible
basis. Once this phase is completed, Alice and Bob use an
authenticated public channel to process their correlated
data in order to obtain a secret key. This last procedure,
called key distillation, involves, typically, postselection of
data, error correction to reconcile the data, and privacy
amplification to decouple the data from Eve [5]. A full
proof of the security for the whole protocol has been given
in [6, 7, 8, 9].
After the first demonstration of the feasibility of this
scheme [10], several long-distance implementations have
been realized in the last years (see [11, 12, 13, 14] and
references therein). However, these practical approaches
differ in many important aspects from the original the-
oretical proposal, since that demands technologies that
are beyond our present experimental capability. Espe-
cially, the signals emitted by the source, instead of being
single-photons, are usually weak coherent pulses (WCP)
with typical average photon numbers of 0.1 or higher.
These pulses are described by coherent states in the cho-
sen polarization mode. The quantum channel introduces
considerable attenuation and errors that affect the signals
even when Eve is not present. Finally, the detectors em-
ployed by the receiver have a low detection efficiency and
are noisy. All these modifications jeopardize the security
of the protocol, and leads to limitations of rate and dis-
tance that can be covered by these techniques [15, 16].
A positive security proof against all individual particle
attacks, even with practical signals, has been given in
[17]. More recently, a complete proof of the uncondi-
tional security of this scheme in a realistic setting has
been achieved [18]. This means that, despite practical
restrictions, with the support of the classical information
techniques used in the key distillation phase, it is still
possible to obtain a secure secret key.
The main limitation of QKD based on WCP arises
from the fact that some pulses contain more than one
photon prepared in the same polarization state. Now
Eve is no longer limited by the no-cloning theorem [19]
since in these events the signal itself provides her with
perfect copies of the signal photon. She can perform
the so called Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack on
the multi-photon pulses [15]. This attack provides Eve
with full information about the part of the key gener-
ated with the multi-photon signals [20], without causing
any disturbance in the signal polarization. Together with
an optimal eavesdropping attack on the single-photon
pulses, the PNS attack constitutes Eve’s optimal strat-
egy [17, 18]. This result is stated for a conservative def-
inition of security. In this paradigm, it is commonly as-
sumed that some flaws in Alice and Bob’s devices (e.g.
the detection efficiency and the dark count probability
of the detectors), together with the losses in the chan-
nel, are controlled by Eve, who exploits them to obtain
maximal information about the shared key.
In this paper we analyze a different scenario. We im-
pose constraints on Eve’s capabilities, and we are inter-
ested in the influence that this effect has on her best
strategy. It is necessary to distinguish this work from
earlier ones: here we consider a more relaxed definition
2of security than the one in [17, 18]. In particular, we
study the situation where Eve is not able to manipulate
Alice and Bob’s devices at all, but she is limited to act
exclusively on the quantum channel (See e.g. [21]). The
main motivation to consider this scenario is that from
a practical point of view it constitutes a reasonable de-
scription of a realistic situation, where Alice and Bob can
limit Eve’s influence on their apparatus by some counter-
attack techniques. However, this scenario has not been
analyzed thoroughly. See Appendix A for a discussion
of the articles by Gilbert and Hamrick. In discussions
within the scientific community one often hears the hope
that it is sufficient to consider the PNS attack, but this
time taking into account the finite detection efficiency
of Bob’s detectors. As a result the loss of a photon in
the PNS attack reduces the probability to detect the
remaining signal with the inefficient detectors and less
multi-photon signals contribute to the final key. This sug-
gests higher available rates. However, the analysis of this
scenario is rather subtle, as we will show in this paper.
Note that a first counter example against that believe
is contained in [22] showing that the unambiguous state
discrimination attack of [21] can outperform the adapta-
tion of the photon-number splitting attack of [16, 17] in
the discussed scenario of limited eavesdropping capabil-
ities. This result applied to signals containing at least
three photons. We show that already two-photon pro-
cesses allow for improved eavesdropping in the restricted
scenario.
With our article, we point out the difficulty of
analysing the scenario where Bob’s detection efficiency
cannot be manipulated. For this we refer to the stan-
dard BB84 protocol, where in the first part only the raw
bit rate (before the key distillation phase) is monitored
but not the number of coincidence detections. We con-
struct two specific eavesdropping strategies which do not
subtract photons from all the multi-photon pulses, and
that are more powerful than the PNS attack for some
relevant regimes of the observed error rate. They are
based on specifically chosen cloning attacks. The results
obtained here do not constitute a complete analysis of
Eve’s optimal attack under these restriction, they intro-
duce a new class of eavesdropping strategies that become
relevant only in this scenario. Our results clearly show
that a simple extension of the PNS attack in this sce-
nario fails to deliver security. In an extended version of
the protocol, where Alice and Bob can access the com-
plete photon number statistics of the arriving signal, we
find that the advantage of the cloning attacks is not as
evident, but requires a deeper analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we de-
scribe in more detail the scenario we consider here. This
includes the signal states and detection methods em-
ployed by Alice and Bob together with the technologies
assumed for Eve. In Sec. III we introduce the complete
PNS attack, and we analyze a particular process that is
part of this attack and involves only single-photon sig-
nals and two-photon signals. In Sec. IV we introduce
two more processes that do not subtract photons from
the pulses. They are based on cloning machines oper-
ating only on two-photon pulses. In Sec. V, these two
processes are compared with the PNS process. We show
that, for some relevant regimes of the observed error rate
in the sifted key, the two processes based on cloning ma-
chines provide Eve with more information than the PNS
process. The extended version of the protocol, where Al-
ice and Bob use the full statistics at their disposal to
detect Eve, as introduced in [5, 21, 23] is briefly consider
in Sec. VI. Finally, Sec. VII concludes the paper with a
summary.
II. TOOLBOX FOR ALICE, BOB AND EVE
A. Alice
Alice uses WCP signal states that are described by co-
herent states with a small amplitude α. This corresponds
to the description of a dimmed laser pulse. We consider
otherwise a perfect implementation of the signal states.
The coherent state is given by
|α〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
(αa†)n
n!
|0〉, (1)
with a† being the creation operator for one of the four
BB84 polarizations modes. However, usually there is
no reference phase available outside Alice’s lab, and the
state that Bob and Eve see is not a coherent state
|α〉, but the phase-averaged form of the signal, ρ =
1
2pi
∫
φ
|eiφα〉〈eiφα| dφ. This results in an effective signal
state which is a mixture of Fock states with a Poisso-
nian photon-number distribution of mean µ = |α|2. It is
described by the density matrix
ρ = e−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
|n〉〈n|, (2)
where the state |n〉 denotes the Fock state with n photons
in one of the four BB84 polarization states.
B. Bob
We consider that Bob employs the active detection
setup shown in Fig. 1. It consists of a polarization ana-
lyzer and a polarization shifter which effectively changes
the polarization basis of the subsequent measurement.
The polarization analyzer has two detectors, monitoring
each one output of a polarizing beam splitter. These
detectors are characterized by their detection efficiency
ηdet. They can be described by a combination of beam
splitters of transmittance ηdet and ideal detectors [24].
This model can be simplified further by considering that
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FIG. 1: The polarization shifter allows to change the polar-
ization basis (+ and ×) of the measurement as desired. The
polarization analyzer consists of a polarizing beam splitter
(PB) and two ideal detectors. The PB discriminates the two
orthogonal polarized modes. Detection efficiencies are mod-
eled by a beam splitter (BS) of transmittance ηdet.
both detectors are equal. In this situation, it is possi-
ble to attribute the losses of both detectors to a single-
loss beam splitter which is located after the transmission
channel. We assume that the detectors cannot distin-
guish the number of photons of arrival signals, but they
provide only two possible outcomes: “click” (at least one
photon is detected), and ”no click” (no photon is detected
in the pulse).
The action of Bob’s detection device can be character-
ized by two POVM, one for each of the two polarization
basis β used in the BB84 protocol [25]. Each POVM
contains four elements [23]: F βvac, F
β
0 , F
β
1 , and F
β
D. The
outcome of the first operator, F βvac, corresponds to no
click in the detectors, the following two POVM opera-
tors, F β0 and F
β
1 , give precisely one detection click (these
are the desired measurements), and the last one, F βD,
gives rise to both detectors being triggered. If we denote
by |n,m〉β the state which has n photons in one mode
and m photons in the orthogonal polarization mode with
respect to the polarization basis β, the elements of the
POVM for this basis are given by
F βvac =
∞∑
n,m=0
η¯n+m |n,m〉β〈n,m|, (3)
F β0 =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− η¯n)η¯m |n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F β1 =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− η¯m)η¯n |n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F βD =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− η¯n)(1 − η¯m) |n,m〉β〈n,m|,
where η¯ = (1− ηdet).
The detectors show also noise in the form of dark
counts which are, to a good approximation, independent
of the signal. Note that the observed errors can be though
as coming from a two-step process: In the first step the
signals are changed as they pass Eve’s domain in the
quantum channel, in the second step random noise from
the detector dark counts is added. If we assume that the
second step cannot be influenced by Eve, then Alice and
Bob can infer the channel error rate, that is assumed
to be due to eavesdropping, from their data and their
knowledge of the detector performance. This means that
only this reduced channel error rate needs to be taken
into account in the privacy amplification step.
C. Eve
As discussed before, we allow Eve to have at her dis-
posal all technology allowed by Quantum Mechanics, but
she is limited to use it exclusively on the quantum chan-
nel. This assumption has two consequences on Eve’s
possible eavesdropping strategies that are vital for the
security analysis of the next sections. In particular, the
detection efficiency ηdet of Bob’s detectors is fixed and
Eve cannot influence it to obtain extra information [26].
Moreover, since we consider that the noise of the de-
tectors is independent of the signals entering them, Eve
cannot make use of the dark counts to increase her infor-
mation.
III. THE PNS ATTACK
In the photon-number splitting attack Eve performs a
quantum non-demolition measurement of the total num-
ber of photons of each signal. Whenever she finds that
a signal contains two or more photons, she deterministi-
cally takes one photon out. The remaining photons are
then forwarded to Bob. The photons in Eve’s hand will
reveal its signal polarization to Eve if she waits with her
measurement until she learns the polarization basis dur-
ing the key distillation phase. If the loss of the channel is
strong enough, Eve can block all the single-photon pulses
and forward only the remaining photons of multi-photon
signals by a lossless channel; on these signals she can ob-
tain the whole information. In this situation no secure
key can be generated. When the loss is not high enough
for this, then Eve can block only a fraction of the single-
photon signals, but she can perform some optimal eaves-
dropping attack on the remaining single-photon pulses.
Moreover, the whole process can be adapted such that it
mimics the photon number statistics of a lossy channel
in typical situations [27].
When Bob uses a detection setup with ideal detectors,
or Eve can manipulate their efficiency such as ηdet = 1,
then the PNS attack constitutes Eve’s optimal strategy
[17, 18]. The reason is that in this case all signals that
provide Eve with full information about the key (multi-
photon pulses) contribute for the raw key. If the detec-
tors have a detection efficiency ηdet < 1 which Eve cannot
change, we find that with certain probability the multi-
photon signals can also contribute to vacuum events in
the detection process. In this situation, there are regimes
where the PNS attack is still Eve’s optimal eavesdrop-
ping strategy. This happens when the loss in the channel
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FIG. 2: Process included in the PNS attack. With probability
p the pulse contains two photons, Eve takes on photon out of
it, and she sends the remained one photon to Bob. In the case
of single-photon signals (probability 1− p), Eve performs an
optimal eavesdropping attack (OA) on these pulses.
is sufficiently high such that the number of non-vacuum
signals expected to arrive at Bob’s detection device is
smaller than the number of multi-photon signals. Here
we consider the regime where this is not the case. This
means that Eve needs to compensate the effect of the
undetected multi-photon signals by increasing the num-
ber of single-photons signals that is sent to Bob. This
fact reduces the effectiveness of the PNS attack, and one
might consider the existence of better strategies for Eve.
We focus in a particular combination of processes that
are contained in the extended PNS attack [27], now
with imperfect detectors. This combination includes only
some two-photon processes (with probability p) and some
one-photon processes (probability 1− p) from the whole
eavesdropping strategy. It is represented in Fig. 2. The
objective is to obtain Eve’s maximum information on this
combination of processes given a particular disturbance
in the signals. For that, we employ the concept of mutual
information given by Shannon. Under this definition, it
has been proven that the optimal attack on single-photon
signals (OA), i. e. the one that provides Eve maximum
information about the raw key, coincides with the opti-
mal individual attack on these signals [28]. This opti-
mal individual attack has been introduced by Fuchs et.
al. in [29]. In the symmetric strategy, every qubit sig-
nal ρA sent by Alice is transformed into the mixed state
ρB = (1 − 2D)ρA + D1 . The disturbance D represents
the error rate in the sifted key within the chosen signals;
it is not the overall observed error rate. The connection
between the two error rates is made in section VA. For
a given value of D, Eve’s maximum information in this
attack is given by [29]
IAE =
1
2
Φ
(
2
√
D(1 −D)
)
, (4)
where the function Φ is defined as Φ(x) = (1+x) log2(1+
x) + (1 − x) log2(1 − x). With this result, now it is
straightforward to obtain Eve’s maximum information in
the PNS process of Fig. 2, as a function of p and D,
IPNSAE = p+
1− p
2
Φ
(
2
√
D(1−D)
)
. (5)
CLOp
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FIG. 3: When the pulse contains two photons, Eve employs
an asymmetric cloning machine which produces three clones.
She keeps one of the clones, and she sends the other two
clones to Bob. This occur with probability p. In the case of
a single-photon pulse (probability 1− p), she blocks it.
In the next section we introduce two more combination
of processes that have the same input signals as those of
Fig. 2. Then, in Sec. V we show that these new processes
provide Eve more information than the PNS process, for
some relevant regimes of D. Moreover, the raw bit rate
of all the processes can be selected to be the same. This
means that the substitution of the combination of pro-
cesses of Fig. 2 by any of the new combinations leads
to a better eavesdropping strategy in terms of Shannon
information.
IV. CLONING ATTACKS
Another possible eavesdropping alternative for Eve is
not to reduce the number of photons in the signal as
in the PNS attack. Instead, she can interact with the
signals via a photon-number conserving interaction of a
probe system with the signal photons. Then, after the
information about the polarization basis is publicly re-
vealed, Eve can obtain information about the key by
measuring her probe. In this attack, multi-photon signals
maintain their photon-number and can therefore con-
tribute with higher probability to a ”click” event. There-
fore, the fraction of the single-photon signals in this at-
tack can be decreased. In principle, one would like to
optimize this type of attack over all possible probes and
their interaction. However, for the sake of simplicity,
we restrict our analysis to the case of two particular in-
teractions representing cloning machines. This is moti-
vated by the fact that the optimal individual attack for
single-photon pulses coincides with the optimal phase-
covariant cloning machine [30]. These cases already proof
our point.
Consider the process represented in Fig. 3. The in-
put signals are the same of the process of Fig. 2. But
here Eve employs an asymmetric cloning machine for all
two-photon pulses, while she blocks all the single-photon
pulses. The parameter p can be selected such that the
processes of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 have the same raw key rate.
This is done in Sec. V, when we compare them. We con-
sider two particular asymmetric cloning machines that
5have been proposed by Ac´ın et al. in [31]. They gener-
alize the 1→ 2 asymmetric cloning machines introduced
in [32, 33] to the 2 → 3 case. But before introducing
these cloning machines and study the performance of the
process of Fig. 3 for each of them (strategies A and B
below), we introduce a qubit representation for the two-
photon pulses emitted by Alice that is used in the next
subsections.
The set of two-photon signals employed in the
BB84 protocol span a three dimensional Hilbert space.
They can be represented in the symmetric sub-
space of two-qubits, which contains the signal states
|0〉⊗2, |1〉⊗2, |+〉⊗2, and |−〉⊗2, where |±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ±
|1〉).
A. STRATEGY A
In this attack Eve uses an asymmetric universal cloning
machine. It takes as an input state two copies of an
unknown one-qubit state, plus a two-qubit probe. Its
unitary transformation is defined by [31]
U |ψ〉⊗2|00〉 = α|ψ〉⊗2|φ+〉+ β
(
σ˜z |ψ〉⊗2|φ−〉+
σ˜x|ψ〉⊗2|ψ+〉+ iσ˜y|ψ〉⊗2|ψ−〉
)
, (6)
where the operator σ˜k = σk ⊗ 1 + 1 ⊗σk (for k = x, y, z)
with the usual Pauli operators σk, the states |ψ±〉 =
1/
√
2(|01〉 ± |10〉), |φ±〉 = 1/√2(|00〉 ± |11〉), and α2 +
8β2 = 1. In the output, the state of the first two qubits
belong to the symmetric subspace of two-qubits signals,
and correspond to the two photons that are sent to Bob.
The third and fourth qubit constitute the probe that is
kept by Eve. Next we calculate the information that Eve
can obtain on Alice’s signal as part of a sifted key by
measuring her probe after the public announcement of
basis.
Eve’s probe for the signals |+〉⊗2, and |−〉⊗2, after ap-
plying the cloning machine, is given by
ρ+ = 2D| −+〉〈−+ |+ (1− 2D)|ϕ+〉〈ϕ+|, (7)
and
ρ− = 2D|+−〉〈+ − |+ (1− 2D)|ϕ−〉〈ϕ−|, (8)
respectively, where |ϕ±〉 = 1/
√
1− 2D(√1− 4D|φ+〉 ±√
2D|ψ+〉) [34]. Note that in the subspace spanned
by the two-qubit states | −+〉 and |+−〉 Eve can dis-
criminate between ρ+ and ρ− perfectly. In the or-
thogonal subspace spanned by |φ+〉 and |ψ+〉, however,
the states ρ+ and ρ− present a non-vanishing overlap
x = 〈ϕ+|ϕ−〉 = (1−6D)/(1−2D). In this subspace, Eve’s
maximum information is given by IAE = 1/2Φ(
√
1− x2)
[35, 36]. This means that Eve’s maximum information in
this cloning machine can be written as a function of D
as
IAAE = 2D +
1− 2D
2
Φ
(√
8D(1− 4D)
1− 2D
)
. (9)
This expressions holds also for the signals of the other po-
larization basis, so that it denotes also the total Shannon
information over all signals.
Here, and also in the next subsection, we consider that
double click events are not discard by Bob, but they con-
tribute to the raw key. Every time Bob obtains a double
click, he just decides randomly the bit value [5].
B. STRATEGY B
The second cloning machine we consider is a phase-
covariant cloning machine. The unitary transformation
of this cloning machine is given by [31]
U |ϕ〉|00〉 = (V |ϕ〉|0〉)|0〉+ (V˜ |ϕ〉|0〉)|1〉, (10)
where |ϕ〉 can be any state in the symmetric 2-qubit
Hilbert space, and V is the unitary transformation
V |00〉|0〉 = |000〉 (11)
V |ψ+〉|0〉 = cos γ(|010〉+ |100〉) + sin γ|001〉√
1 + cos2 γ
V |11〉|0〉 = cos γ|110〉+ sin γ(|011〉+ |101〉)√
1 + sin2 γ
,
V˜ has the same form as V but interchanging zeros and
ones on the right hand side of Eq. (11), and 0 ≤ γ ≤
pi. The first two output qubits of this cloning machine
belong again to the symmetric subspace of two-qubits
signals and correspond with the two photons which are
sent to Bob, while the other two qubits constitute Eve’s
probe.
Following the same argumentation used in strategy A,
when Alice sends the signals |+〉⊗2, |−〉⊗2 [37], the state
of Eve’s probe is given by ρ+ or ρ−, depending on the
particular state chose by Alice. The states ρ+ and ρ− can
be written in the basis |+〉|+〉, |+〉|−〉, |−〉|+〉, |−〉|−〉 as
ρ+ =
1
16


a 0 0 b
0 d e 0
0 e f 0
b 0 0 c

 , and ρ− = 1
16


c 0 0 b
0 f e 0
0 e d 0
b 0 0 a

 ,
(12)
respectively, where the coefficients a, b, c, d, e, and f are
complicated functions of the parameter γ. The exact ex-
pression of these coefficients is given in appendix B. To
calculate Eve’s maximum information in this case, we
can decompose Eve’s optimal measurement again in two
steps. First, she performs a projection measurement onto
the two orthogonal subspaces spanned by |+〉|+〉, |−〉|−〉,
and |+〉|−〉, |−〉|+〉, respectively. This measurement re-
duces the optimization problem in the whole space, to
discriminate in each subspace between two equiprobable
one-qubit states whose density matrices have the same in-
variants. This problem was solved by Levitin in [35]. The
maximum of the mutual information in each subspace is
6given by I = 1/2Φ(
√
1− r − 2d), where r represents the
trace of the product of the two states, and d is the deter-
minant of their density matrices. Using the expressions
for Eve’s maximum information in each subspaces, one
can obtain Eve’s maximum information in the cloning
machine as a function of the coefficients a, c, d, and f . It
is given implicitly by
IBAE =
1
32
{
(a+c)Φ
(
a− c
a+ c
)
+(d+f)Φ
(
d− f
d+ f
)}
. (13)
The disturbance D in this case has the form
D =
1
2
{
1− 1√
2(1 + cos2 γ)
(
cos γ +
1√
1 + sin2 γ
)}
.
(14)
Again, due to symmetry with respect to the polarization
bases, Eq. (13) holds also for the total average Shannon
information.
V. PNS ATTACK VERSUS CLONING ATTACKS
The processes represented in Fig. 2 and in Fig. 3, for
both cloning machines, gives a symmetric detection pat-
tern. That is, if Bob measures the signals in the same
basis chosen by Alice when preparing the states, then the
probability of obtaining a correct result, a wrong result,
or a double click is the same for all the signals. Otherwise
the outcomes corresponding to events with one detection
click are completely random. For a fair comparison of
the PNS process and the two cloning processes, we need
to assure that the raw bit rate in Bob’s detectors is the
same for all of them, pηdet+(1−p)ηdet = pηdet(2−ηdet).
The left-hand-side of the equation is the number of clicks
of the PNS process, while the right-hand-side is the num-
ber of clicks expected in Fig. 3 for both cloning machines.
This means that p = 1/(2−ηdet). If we include this value
in Eq. (5), Eve’s maximum information in the PNS pro-
cess is now written as
IPNSAE =
1
2− ηdet
{
1+
1− ηdet
2
Φ
(
2
√
D(1−D)
)}
. (15)
This expression can now be directly compared with
Eq. (9) and Eq. (13). The results are plotted in Fig. 4 and
show regimes of D for which the process based on cloning
machines provides Eve with more information than the
PNS process. Note that Eve’s maximum information in
the cloning processes is independent of ηdet. This fact
comes from the matching condition for the raw bit rate.
In the PNS process, as expected, when ηdet approaches
one, also IPNSAE approaches one, since the PNS attack is
the optimal strategy for Eve’s in the case of ideal detec-
tors. In the phase-covariant cloning machine of strategy
B, Eve’s maximum information never reaches one. The
reason is that in this particular cloning machine none
of the two qubits kept by Eve can reach a fidelity one
with respect to the input state. For low values of D,
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FIG. 4: Eve’s maximum information versus the disturbance
D: PNS process for increasing, equally spaced values of ηdet
(solid). The lower line corresponds to ηdet = 0.1, while the
upper line corresponds to ηdet = 0.9. Universal cloning ma-
chine, Strategy A (dotted). Phase-covariant cloning machine,
Strategy B (dashdot).
this cloning machine gives Eve more information than
the universal cloning machine of strategy A. From the
perspective of cloning machines this fact is not surpris-
ing. The fidelity achievable in the clones depends always
on the set of allowed input states. As more information
about the input set is known, better the input states can
be cloned. The phase covariant cloning machine exploits
the fact that the input states are equatorial qubits. That
is, the z component of their Bloch vector is zero. The
cloning machine of strategy A, however, is designed to
clone any input qubit with the same fidelity.
A. OBSERVED ERROR RATE
In this section we obtain the relationship between the
disturbance D, which appears in Fig. 4, and the overall
observed error rate e which is measured in the experi-
ment. This relationship can be established by an analysis
of the PNS attack alone, which includes here the optimal
eavesdropping on single photon signals, as before.
The probability that a multi-photon signal undergoes
the PNS attack and then is detected by Bob’s detection
device is given by
Pmultiarr =
∞∑
n=2
P (n, µ)[1− η¯n−1], (16)
where P (n, µ) = e−µµn/n! is the photon-number distri-
bution of the signal states emitted by Alice, given by
Eq. (2). On the other hand, the expected click rate at
Bob’s side has the form
Pexp = 1− e−µηdetηt , (17)
where ηt is the transmission efficiency of the quantum
channel. The total loss in dB of the quantum channel is
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FIG. 5: Observed error rate e versus the disturbance D as a
function of the loss in dB of the quantum channel. The mean
photon number µ is 0.1 and ηdet is 0.2 in this example.
given by −10 log10 ηt. From P singlearr and Pexp one can ob-
tain the probability that single-photon signals contribute
to the raw key. It is given by
P singlearr = Pexp − Pmultiarr . (18)
The multi-photon pulses does not introduce any error in
the sifted key. This means that
e =
P singlearr
Pexp
D (19)
After substituting the values of Pexp and P
single
arr into
Eq. (19) we finally obtain
e =
e−µ(ηdete
µηdetηt + eµ(1− ηdet)− eµ(1−ηdet(1−ηt)))
(1− ηdet)(1− eµηdetηt) D
(20)
This result is illustrated in Fig. 5 for some typical values
of µ and ηdet. When the loss in the channel increases, the
observed error rate e for each value of D, as expected,
decreases. The regime that we consider here corresponds
with a value of the loss in the channel such as Eve can
perform a PNS attack on all the multi-photon pulses,
but Pexp > P
multi
arr . The first condition requires
Pexp ≤ ηdetP (1, µ) + Pmultiarr , (21)
which provides an upper bound for the transmission effi-
ciency of the channel
ηt ≤ −
ln[ e
−µ(eµ(1−ηdet)−ηdet(1+µ(1−ηdet)))
1−ηdet
]
µηdet
(22)
The second constraint Pexp > P
multi
arr implies a lower
bound for ηt
ηt > −
ln[ e
−µηdet−ηdete
−µ
1−ηdet ]
µηdet
(23)
The meaning of this condition is to guarantee that we
are not in a regimen where the PNS attack is still Eve’s
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FIG. 6: The disturbance D as a function of the loss in dB of
the quantum channel for a fix value of the observed error rate
e = 0.01. The mean photon number µ is 0.1 and ηdet is 0.2.
optimal strategy. When µ = 0.1 and ηdet = 0.2, we
obtain for the lower and upper bound 0.17dB and 13.2dB,
respectively.
The process based on cloning machines become more
powerful than the PNS process for lower values e when
the loss is high. The typical value of the observed error
rate in the experiments is around 1% if we consider only
errors in the quantum channel. Therefore, it is interest-
ing to see how the value of the disturbance D change as
a function of the loss in the channel when we impose e to
be 1%. This is illustrated in Fig. 6. We find, in combi-
nation with Fig. 4 that for losses higher than 12.5dB the
PNS attack is clearly no longer optimal for these typical
parameters.
It is worth to point out that when the losses in the
channel are small, but still inside the interval imposed
by Eq. (22) and Eq. (23), the eavesdropping attack which
includes the cloning machine can be made more powerful
than the PNS attack even for a lower value of e than the
one given in Eq. (20). The reason is that, although in
this situation Eve cannot discard too many single-photon
pulses, she can re-distribute the errors from the single-
photon processes into the two-photon processes. To this
end, she increases her intrusion via the cloning attack on
the two-photon signals, while she reduces her intrusion
on the single-photon signals. The exploitation of this
effect is beyond the scope of this article.
VI. PHOTON STATISTICS
In the previous sections we consider the case of the
standard BB84 protocol, where only the raw bit rate is
monitored. Here, we briefly discuss the case of the ex-
tended version of the protocol, where Alice and Bob uses
the full statistics at their disposal to detect Eve.
In this scenario, it is straightforward to see that the
processes of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 are not equivalent. The
PNS process of Fig. 2 can never produce a double click
in Bob’s detectors, while the process of Fig. 3 presents
always a non-vanishing probability of producing a dou-
8ble click, independently of the basis that Bob uses for his
measurement. In fact, the PNS attack never produces
a double click event when Bob chooses for his measure-
ment the same basis that Alice used when preparing the
signals. This means that, in principle, Alice and Bob
might employ this information to discard any eavesdrop-
ping strategy that includes the cloning process. How-
ever, if we consider a real implementation of the proto-
col, then the situation is not so simple. The reason is
that the quantum channel is not just lossy, but presents
a misalignment that introduces errors in the signals [38].
As a result we have that any multi-photon signal has a
non-zero probability of providing a double click, indepen-
dently of the basis used by Bob in his measurement. This
means that Eve must adapt the PNS attack such that
it reproduces the expected misalignment in the channel.
Otherwise her attack would be detected. In particular,
Eve have to introduce some noise in the signals that are
sent to Bob. In the case of single-photon pulses, this can
be achieved by sending the signals through a depolarizing
channel of appropriate parameters. This is precisely the
effect of the symmetric OA introduced in Sec. III. There-
fore, in these pulses, Eve can always get information from
this extra noise. The multi-photon pulses, however, gives
already Eve full information about the key, and she can-
not exploit the noise she needs to introduce to get more
information from the single-photon pulses.
The eavesdropping attack which includes the cloning
machine can also be adapted such that it reproduces the
statistics that is expected from a realistic channel. How-
ever, the question whether it remains more powerful than
the PNS attack, in this scenario, requires a deeper anal-
ysis. If we consider the situation where Eve performs a
PNS attack on the pulses that contain more than two
photons, and the misalignment in the channel is suffi-
ciently strong for Eve to get full information from the
cloning process, then Eve can obtain as much information
as with the PNS attack. If the misalignment is smaller,
it seems that the strategy that combines the cloning pro-
cess with the PNS attack on the remaining multi-photon
pulses cannot be more powerful than the PNS attack.
The reason is that the adapted version of the PNS attack
still contains processes that do not produce any double
click in Bob’s detectors, independently of the basis that
Bob uses for his measurement. To compensate this ef-
fect, Eve has to subtract more than one photon from the
multi-photon pulses, such that she creates processes that
do not produce double clicks. But now the effectiveness
of the complete strategy decreases, since the probability
that the signals which provide Eve full information about
the key (multi-photon pulses) contribute to the raw key
decreases.
Although this fact constitutes a handicap of the eaves-
dropping strategy that combines the cloning process of
Fig. 3 with the PNS attack on the rest of the pulses,
it might be of relative importance in practice. Double
clicks are rare events that have a very small probabil-
ity to occur, and the statistical fluctuations in the chan-
nel, together with the effect of dark counts in Bob’s de-
tectors, makes the detection of Eve’s presence not easy.
Moreover, Eve might also use a mixed strategy that com-
bines probabilistically the PNS process of Fig. 2 and the
cloning process of Fig. 3, such as her attack remains still
more powerful than the PNS attack, while making her
detection even more difficult.
VII. CONCLUSION
In an ideal quantum optical implementation of QKD,
the sender use single photons to encode the informa-
tion he transmits. However, current experiments are
not based on single photon sources, but they are usually
based on weak coherent pulses (WCP) with a low average
photon number. Also the detectors employed by the re-
ceiver are not perfect, but have a low detection efficiency
and are noisy. This fact, together with the loss in the
quantum channel, limits the distances that can be cov-
ered by these methods. In this scenario, it is tempting to
assume that the loss in the detectors cannot be changed
by Eve in order to increase the covered distance, while the
PNS attack, like in the case of a conservative definition of
security, still constitutes Eve’s optimal strategy. In this
paper we disprove this belief for the case of the standard
BB84 protocol, where only the raw bit rate (before the
key distillation phase) is monitored. We constructed two
specific eavesdropping strategies which include processes
that do not subtract photons from the pulses, and that
are more powerful than the PNS attack for some rele-
vant regimes of the observed error rate. These strategies
are based on the use of cloning machines. A complete
analysis of Eve’s optimal attack in this situation is still
missing. In the extended version of the BB84 protocol,
where Alice and Bob consider the full statistics at their
disposal, the situation is not as straightforward, and a
deeper security analysis of this scenario is required.
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APPENDIX A: RELATED WORK
An investigation of the scenario where Eve cannot im-
prove Bob’s detectors has been undertaken in [22]. We
believe that this investigation is incomplete so far. The
authors claim that they have performed an thorough
9analysis of the situation where Bob’s detection efficiency
cannot manipulated by Alice, together with the restric-
tion of an ’individual attack’. The authors define ’indi-
vidual attack’ radically different from the usual terminol-
ogy that is used in the analysis of quantum key distribu-
tion: they refer to attacks that act on photons individu-
ally, rather than signals. In practice this means that the
authors consider optimal attacks on single photon signals,
which can be implemented by attaching a probe to a sin-
gle photon, on the other hand, they disallow attaching a
probe to a two-photon signal, since that would mean to
interact with the two photons ’coherently’. In fact, they
state [22] that such manipulations would be possible only
when quantum computers become available.
Of course, it is not unusual to start with some assump-
tions about restrictions of eavesdropping strategies. For
example, investigation of an individual attack scenario
(now referring to the standard definition that relates to
the signal pulses) has proven to be very powerful since
the analysis can be performed easily and the resulting pa-
rameters for privacy amplification and the secure key rate
corresponds roughly to the subsequently derived values
that assure security again all attacks, including coherent
attacks on all signals. From this experience the individ-
ual attack derives its role as a first step investigation of
the performance and security analysis of QKD schemes.
The relationship between individual and coherent attacks
has been strengthened by the results of Wang [28].
In the scenario considered by [22] we cannot see an
equivalent role. Another motivation to investigate re-
stricted scenarios might be the technological challenge of
different eavesdropping strategies. However, the techno-
logical difference between attaching a probe to a single
photon as compared to attaching a probe to a two-photon
signal is not evident. Clearly, these questions do not in-
validate the obtained results. However, in our point of
view, the authors of [22] are inconsistent in describing
the restrictions of their considered eavesdropping attacks.
They claim that as a consequence of their restriction they
need to consider only three types of attacks:
1. ’Direct attacks’ in which Eve can unambiguously
determine the signal state by a direct measurement
of the signal. This corresponds to the unambiguous
state discrimination attack in [21]. (Requires at
least 3 photons.)
2. ’Indirect attacks’, which is precisely the PNS at-
tack [15, 16, 17] that extract one photon from the
signal. (Requires at least 2 photons.)
3. ’Combined attacks’ which performs the indirect
and the direct attack. (Requires therefore at least
5 photons, and is in the analysis later on shown to
be an inferior attack.)
It is left open how these categories emerge and why this
should be a complete description. As first point of crit-
icism note that the authors apply for the ’direct attack’
the results of [21] that provide the performance for op-
timal unambiguous state discrimination measurements.
Can we implement this attack by acting ’individually’ on
photons? A second point of criticism is that to perform
these attacks Eve needs to know the number of photons
in each pulse. If one thinks of photons as distinguishable
particles in a pulse, this might be easy. In a proper quan-
tum optical description, however, these type of counting
mechanisms, which do not disturb the signal, will require
in all experience the same level of interaction between a
probe and the total signal, as does a general eavesdrop-
ping attack on the signal.
So far, we pointed at inconsistencies that do not endan-
ger the security statement derived in [22]. These attacks
overestimate Eve’s capabilities as compared to the initial
restriction that require ’individual’ attacks on photons.
However, the categorization by Gilbert and Hamrick left
out possible attacks. Those attacks still operate on ’in-
dividual’ photons only. As an example let us consider a
two-photon pulse. According to [22] the only attack we
need to consider is the PNS attack. Instead, let Eve per-
form a direct measurement on the photons, for example
in the sense of a minimum-error measurement. Of course,
the error will be non-zero, since on a two-photon state
in the BB84 polarizations one cannot perform success-
fully unambiguous state discrimination. However, opti-
mal eavesdropping on single-photon signals also results in
some errors. Another attack would be to separate the two
photons. Then one can attack probes to both photons
and try to combine the photons again in Bob’s detection
apparatus, e.g. by sending them to Bob in close sequence
so that Bob does not notice that they have been sepa-
rated. Moreover, similar attacks are omitted for higher
photon numbers.
These examples question the completeness of the pro-
posed classification of eavesdropping attacks in [22]. Note
that after receiving an advance copy of this manuscript
the authors of [22] revised their work, acknowledging the
incompleteness of their analysis. This means that we
have to treat the classification as an assumption that only
those three classes are of relevance. This includes the as-
sumption that for the two-photon pulse the PNS attack
is optimal in their restricted scenario. As a consequence,
a security claim for an experimental implementation of
QKD should not be based on this analysis, as done in
[22, 39], since it underestimates Eve’s ability. Neverthe-
less, within the three investigated classes of eavesdrop-
ping attacks, Gilbert and Hamrick have been able to show
that the unambiguous state discrimination attack can be
more effective for Eve than the photon-number splitting
attack for signals containing three or more photons.
APPENDIX B: EXPLICIT EXPRESSIONS
In this appendix we provide the exact expressions for
the coefficients a, b, c, d, e, and f that are introduced in
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Eq. (12), as a function of the angle γ.
a = 1 +
4 sin γ√
3 + cos(2γ)
+
10 sin(2γ)√
3 + cos(2γ)
√
1 + sin2 γ
+
2 cosγ√
1 + sin2 γ
+ cos2 γ
(
8
1 + cos2 γ
+
1
1 + sin2 γ
)
+4 sin2 γ
(
1
3 + cos(2γ)
+
1
1 + sin2 γ
)
,
b = 1 +
2 cosγ√
1 + sin2 γ
+
8 sin2 γ(9 + cos(2γ))
−17 + cos(4γ)
+ cos2 γ
(
8
1 + cos2 γ
+
1
1 + sin2 γ
)
,
c = 1− 4 sin γ√
3 + cos(2γ)
− 10 sin(2γ)√
3 + cos(2γ)
√
1 + sin2 γ
+
2 cosγ√
1 + sin2 γ
+ cos2 γ
(
8
1 + cos2 γ
+
1
1 + sin2 γ
)
+4 sin2 γ
(
1
3 + cos(2γ)
+
1
1 + sin2 γ
)
,
d = 1 +
4 sin2 γ
3 + cos(2γ)
+
cos2 γ
1 + sin2 γ
− 2 cos γ√
1 + sin2 γ
+
4 sinγ(− cos γ +
√
1 + sin2 γ)√
3 + cos(2γ)
√
1 + sin2 γ
,
e = 1− 4 sin
2 γ
3 + cos(2γ)
+
cos2 γ
1 + sin2 γ
− 2 cosγ√
1 + sin2 γ
,
and
f = 1− 4 sin γ√
3 + cos(2γ)
+
4 sin2 γ
3 + cos(2γ)
+
cos2 γ
1 + sin2 γ
− 2 cosγ√
1 + sin2 γ
+
2 sin(2γ)√
3 + cos(2γ)
√
1 + sin2 γ
,
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